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In this paper, we investigate whether cognitive reflection and numeracy skills affect the
quality of the consumers’ decision-making process in a purchase decision context. In a
first (field) experiment, an identical product was on sale in two shops with different initial
prices and discounts. One of the two deals was better than the other and the consumers
were asked to choose the best one and to describe which arithmetic operations they
used to solve the problem; then they were asked to complete the numeracy scale
(Lipkus et al., 2001). The choice procedures used by the consumers were classified as
“complete decision approach” when all the arithmetic operations needed to solve the
problem were computed, and as “partial decision approach” when only some operations
were computed. A mediation model shows that higher numeracy is associated with use
of the complete decision approach. In turn, this approach is positively associated with
the quality of the purchase decision. Given that these findings highlight the importance
of the decision processes, in a second (laboratory) experiment we used a supplementary
method to study the type of information search used by the participants: eye-tracking. In
this experiment the participants were presented with decision problems similar to those
used in Experiment 1 and they completed the Lipkus numeracy scale and the Cognitive
Reflection Test (CRT; Frederick, 2005). Participants with a high CRT score chose the
best deal more frequently, and showed a more profound and detailed information
search pattern compared to participants with a low CRT score. Overall, results indicate
that higher levels of cognitive reflection and numeracy skills predict the use of a more
thorough decision process (measured with two different techniques: retrospective verbal
reports and eye movements). In both experiments the decision process is a crucial factor
which greatly affects the quality of the purchase decision.
Keywords: numeracy, CRT, eye movements, decision-making processes, economic choice
Introduction
Individual diﬀerences in cognitive abilities inﬂuence important decisions in many domains.
Economic decisions, which strongly aﬀect the well-being of the persons, are a primary example.
In this domain, Burks et al. (2009) show that in a large sample of workers (1,000 trainee
truckers) those with higher cognitive skills (Numeracy, ability to plan and non-verbal IQ)
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were more likely to successfully complete their training in a
condition where the failure to complete the course involved
refunding the training cost. It has also been shown that there is a
correlation between higher levels of ﬁnancial literacy (measured
with questions based on the ability to manipulate numbers) and
two relevant economic decisions: save for retirement through a
private pension plan (Fornero and Monticone, 2011; Lusardi and
Mitchell, 2011) and holding stocks (Van Rooij et al., 2011).
A cognitive skill – Numeracy – has a great inﬂuence on
decisions in the economic context, where often the characteristics
of the options are expressed in numerical terms. Data from
surveys related to macroeconomic variables that were run in the
US, UK, Australia, and Canada indicate that higher Numeracy
is associated with higher earnings and higher probability to be
employed (Charette and Meng, 1998; McIntosh and Vignoles,
2001; Chiswick et al., 2003; McArdle et al., 2009). At a
microeconomic level, Chen and Rao (2007), show how people
often mistakenly evaluate the consequences of a sequence of
percentage changes and how their intention to purchase a
product is aﬀected by these erroneous calculations. Economic
decisions can be problematic in particular for lowly numerate
consumers, who resort to a variety of coping strategies (e.g., to
buy only known brands) in order to overcome the diﬃculties
presented by the quantitative description of goods (Adkins
and Ozanne, 2005; Viswanathan et al., 2005). These ﬁndings,
in addition to highlighting the central inﬂuence of individual
diﬀerences in cognitive skills, suggest that additional research
is needed to understand in greater detail how speciﬁc cognitive
skills aﬀect economic decision-making. The present study focuses
on two cognitive skills: Numeracy and Cognitive Reﬂection.
We investigate how diﬀerent levels in these two cognitive skills
aﬀect the decision process and the quality of choice. The
role of Numeracy is investigated in Experiment 1. The role
of Numeracy and Cognitive Reﬂection are jointly investigated
in Experiment 2. The quality of choice is investigated by
using scenarios where the participants choose one of two
alternative oﬀers of the same product, with one option that
is more valuable than the other. The use of problems that
have an optimal solution allows us to investigate the role of
cognitive skills on the quality of choice, rather than focusing
on choice consistency as in the more familiar literature on
framing, inter-temporal choices and similar decision tasks. For
a discussion on the diﬀerences between problems that involve
optimal choices or consistent choices see Reyna and Brainerd
(2008).
Numeracy
“Numeracy” has been deﬁned as the ability to comprehend, use
and attach meaning to numbers (Peters et al., 2006; Reyna and
Brainerd, 2008; Reyna et al., 2009). In particular, Numeracy
includes the ability to compare magnitudes, and comprehend
ratio concepts (including fractions, proportions, percentages,
and probabilities). Several studies tried to determine which are
the psychological processes underlying the ability to correctly
comprehend and manipulate numeric information. Diﬀerent
viewpoints have been suggested: for example Lipkus and Peters
(2009) propose a model based on a dual system approach
(see Sloman, 1996; Stanovich and West, 2000; Kahneman and
Frederick, 2002; Kahneman, 2003) where the two systems
are responsible for diﬀerent steps of the comprehension and
manipulation of numbers. System 1 is activated during the initial
step of this process: when people perceive a numeric stimulus
they intuitively evaluate its magnitude (Peters et al., 2008).
A subsequent step – number manipulation – is based on logic
operations which are part of System 2. Finally, these operations
(generated by Systems 1 and 2) concur to the formation of
a meaning/interpretation of the numeric information. In this
model the functions of the two systems are strictly intertwined
and this is coherent with the idea that good choices are most
likely to emerge when the two modes work in concert (Damasio,
1994). Fuzzy-trace theory (see Reyna and Brainerd, 1995; Reyna,
2004) also proposes a dual system approach, which includes
verbatim processing (based on precise, detailed, or quantitative
representations) and gist processing (based on fuzzy, gist, or
qualitative representations). According to this theory some biases
(e.g., ratio bias, denominator neglect) result from gist-based
processes: people focus their attention on what they believe to
be the more salient piece of information (e.g., the numerator
in a fraction or a probability estimate) at the expense of a
more complete description of a problem. However, the fuzzy-
trace theory considers the gist-based processes as more advanced,
compared to the verbatim processes, because they focus on
the essential elements of a problems (see Reyna and Brainerd,
1995; Reyna and Lloyd, 2006). Finally, the frequency hypothesis
(Gigerenzer, 1994; Gigerenzer and Hoﬀrage, 1995) posits that
humans have directly experienced frequencies throughout their
evolutionary history, making frequencies easier to understand
compared to decimals or probabilities, which are expressed on
a normalized scale that does not occur in nature. However,
Chapman and Liu (2009) report an experiment where the
beneﬁts of the natural frequency format occurred primarily for
participants who were high in Numeracy. This result suggests
that in the general population the correct comprehension
of arithmetic problems can not be assured only by the use
of the natural frequencies. For a comparison of the three
approaches mentioned above see Reyna and Brainerd (2008).
Del Missier et al. (2012) describe Numeracy as a general
cognitive ability, which has a sort of intermediate level between
basic abilities (the executive function, i.e., control processes
involved in the regulation of cognition, see Rabbitt, 1997;
Miyake et al., 2000; Royall et al., 2002; Salthouse, 2005) and
more complex skills (e.g., the capacity to correctly apply a
series of decision rules that involve computations). In particular,
a more developed supervision ability – which includes the
monitoring and revision of working memory contents and the
capacity to appropriately inhibit irrelevant information and
responses – is associated with higher Numeracy scores (see
also Mäntylä et al., 2007 for a description of this executive
function).
Numeracy and Choices
The eﬀect of Numeracy on the evaluations and choices has
been investigated in diﬀerent ﬁelds such as risk perception,
risk communication, pro-social and health-related decisions (see:
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Lipkus et al., 2001; Hibbard et al., 2007; Peters et al., 2007a,b,
2011; Nelson et al., 2008; Greene and Peters, 2009; Lipkus
and Peters, 2009; Dickert et al., 2011). The ﬁndings of these
studies show, for example, that the economic decisions of low
numerate people (e.g., the willingness to donate for charity)
are more inﬂuenced by changes in numeric presentation format
than those of people with higher numeracy (Dickert et al.,
2011). Greene and Peters (2009) found that some contracts,
heavily based on numeric information (e.g., health insurance
plans) are diﬃcult to understand especially for low numerate
people. Consequentially, Peters et al. (2007a) found that strategies
which reduce the cognitive load are particularly helpful for
low numeracy consumers. Cokely and Kelley (2009) show that
there is a relationship between cognitive abilities (Numeracy
and Reﬂectiveness, measured through the Cognitive Reﬂection
Test (CRT), decision processes and number of choice that
maximize the expected value in a series of gambles. Overall,
these studies suggest that highly numerate people draw a
more precise and coherent mental representation of numeric
information, compared to low numerate people. In addition,
highly numerate individuals are more skilled in the integration
of numeric information and their choices are less inﬂuenced
by the way the numeric information is framed, as if they can
create a single mental representation of the numeric information,
common to diﬀerent presentation formats. On the contrary, low
numerate people tend to focus their attention on some pieces
of information, without an adequate integration process (Slovic
et al., 2000; Peters et al., 2006, 2008).
Experiment 1
The goal of Experiment 1 is to study the relationship between
Numeracy and the decision process used to choose between
diﬀerent oﬀers of the same product, and how the decision
approach aﬀects the quality of choice. Imagine a consumer who
considers two alternative deals on the same product. Shop A
oﬀers a mobile phone at 180€ with a 15% discount. Shop B oﬀers
the same mobile phone at 220€ with a 25% discount. There are
no transaction costs (e.g., the two shops are at the same distance
from home).
From the Numeracy literature reported in the Section
“Introduction,” we expect that highly numerate people make a
computational eﬀort to select the best deal. For example, in order
to ﬁnd the cheapest option, they calculate the ﬁnal price of both
deals. In more general terms they use a speciﬁc decision process
that includes performing all the arithmetic operations needed to
have a complete description of all the alternatives. We refer to
this decision process as a “complete decision approach” to the
purchase decision task. We expect that the use of a complete
approach to the purchase decision task is positively associated
with the selection of the best deal.
On the contrary, we expect that it is less likely that consumers
with lower Numeracy scores compute the ﬁnal prices of the two
deals. This might be due to several factors. For example, the math
computation is particularly tiring for people with low Numeracy
or they do not trust their numerical skills. Regardless of the actual
determinant, this also implies a speciﬁc decision process in which
consumers do not try to perform all arithmetic operations needed
to calculate the two ﬁnal prices (e.g., they compute only one ﬁnal
price and then give up). Alternatively, they simply do not perform
any computation at all (e.g., they compare the initial prices or
percentage discounts). We refer to this decision process as an
“incomplete decision approach” to the purchase decision task.
We expect that the use of an incomplete decision approach is
positively associated with the selection of the worst deal.
Method
One-hundred and ﬁfty-three consumers participated in this study
and 42% of the participants were males. In order to increase
the ecological validity of our study, we collected the data at the
exit of a shopping mall and asked the participants to choose
one of two alternative oﬀers. Three decision scenarios were
presented with E-Prime 1.0 (Psychology Software Tools, Inc)
software (Schneider et al., 2002a,b), and the participants were
randomly assigned to one of the three scenarios, creating three
groups of equal size. The logic behind our choice of presenting
more than one scenario is that the preferences of the participants
could be aﬀected by speciﬁc pieces of numeric information, in a
way which was diﬃcult to predict1. We believed that presenting
more than one scenario could reduce the risk that our ﬁndings
were overly inﬂuenced by the speciﬁc characteristics of a scenario.
Each scenario uses a diﬀerent product (Mobile phone, DVD
player, Microwave oven), and the ﬁndings show that the choices
are not aﬀected by the kind of product. For this reason, in the
next section the analyses do not include the factor “product2.”
Each scenario describes two shops that oﬀer a deal on the same
product: one shop oﬀers a low percentage discount on a low initial
price (best deal), while the other shop oﬀers a high percentage
discount on a high initial price (worst deal); note that the ﬁnal
prices were not shown to the participants. It may be possible
that people associate higher prices with better quality but since
we speciﬁed that exactly the same product was sold in the two
shops it is unlikely that this association occurred during the
experiment. The participants decided which deal they preferred
(we reversed the order of presentation of the two oﬀers for half
1For example, let’s consider the Microwave oven scenario, where the oven is sold
at Shop A with an initial price of 70 with a 20% discount and at Shop B with
an initial price of 90 with a 30% discount. Some participants could consider
negligible the diﬀerence between 70€ and 90€; in that case they could ignore
the information “initial price” and base their decision only on the remaining
characteristic, the percentage discount (for a description of a similar process see
Leland, 1994; Birnbaum and Gutierrez, 2007). On the contrary, other participants
could consider that the 20€ diﬀerence is important enough to be considered, so
their choice is based on all the provided information.
2We run the mediation model presented below with the addition of the factor
“product.” The relationships between variables are not aﬀected at all by the factor
“product.” The factors Numeracy and Decision Approach remain signiﬁcant,
while the factor “product” is never signiﬁcant. Here we present the relationships
between the variables using a series of correlation analyses. Correlation between
Numeracy and Choice: DVD Player [r(50) = 0.210; p = 0.144]. Microwave oven
[r(51) = 0.158; p = 0.267]. Mobile phone [r(52) = 0.176; p = 0.213]. Correlation
between Decision approach and Choice: DVD Player [r(50) = 0.234; p = 0.102].
Microwave oven [r(51) = 0.032; p = 0.821]. Mobile phone [r(52) = 0.272;
p = 0.051]. Correlation between Numeracy and Decision approach: DVD Player
[r(50) = 0.231; p = 0.107]. Microwave oven [r(51) = 0.262; p = 0.063]. Mobile
phone [r(52)= 0.136; p = 0.335].
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of the participants, but there is no order eﬀect). Table 1 reports
prices, discounts, and ﬁnal prices.
To investigate the decision process underlying the consumer
choice we asked for retrospective verbal reports, a technique
widely used in the cognitive science (Ericsson and Simon, 1980)
and in the J/DM literature as well (for the use of similar
procedures, see Payne, 1976; Rettinger and Hastie, 2003; Cokely
and Kelley, 2009). The rationale for the use of retrospective
verbal protocols in our study is that when people consciously
and deliberately consider information (e.g., the computation of
the absolute value; the subtraction of the absolute value from the
initial price), these processes should be observable in participants’
protocols (Sloman, 1996; Evans, 2008). First we reminded the
consumers of the numerical values of the deals (e.g. “Shop A
oﬀers a 25% discount on a mobile phone that costs 220€”), then
we asked “When you decided in which shop to buy, did you
calculate the corresponding ﬁnal price (i.e., 220€ minus 25%)?”
(Yes vs. No). The question was repeated for the second deal on
the same product.
The verbalization task allows us to measure how many
consumers computed zero, one, or two ﬁnal prices before making
the choice. In order to choose the best deal the consumers should
create a complete description of all the possible alternatives,
which in this scenario means to calculate two ﬁnal prices
(complete decision approach). Consumers who calculated one
or zero ﬁnal prices had a partial/incomplete description of
the options and their choices were most likely based on an
approximate estimation of the ﬁnal prices (partial decision
approach).
Finally, the consumers completed the Lipkus et al. (2001)
questionnaire. This questionnaire is commonly used in the
literature to measure people’s Numeracy skill as discussed
in the Introduction. In the following analyses we use the
number of correct answers as a Numeracy measure. It is
important to note that many items of the Lipkus Numeracy
scale ask participants to transform numeric information from
the percentage format to the frequency format or vice-versa.
The solution of these questions require operations that strongly
resemble the operations needed to calculate the absolute value
of a discount and the corresponding discounted price, i.e., the
operations needed to ﬁnd the best purchase decision. For this
reason we believe that the Lipkus scale is particularly appropriate
for measuring the arithmetic skills used in our experiment.
Results and Discussion
Our ﬁrst analysis studies the correlation between the number
of correct answers given to the Numeracy test (the scale ranges
from 0 to 11, the mean score is 7.39, SD: 2.3, median: 8)
and the time needed to complete the test; the result is not
signiﬁcant [r(153) = −0.12, p = 0.14]. This result indicates
that low Numeracy consumers did not try to ﬁnish a potentially
distressing task as fast as possible, so it is unlikely that the low
Numeracy score is caused by a lack of eﬀort or motivation.
In order to analyze the relationships between Numeracy
(continuous I.V.), decision approach (binary Mediator; complete
vs. partial decision approach) and choice (binary D.V.; best vs.
worst deal), we used a mediation model following the regression
approach proposed by Baron and Kenny (1986). Given that
the dependent variable is dichotomous, we used a series of
binary logistic regressions, as described in Preacher and Hayes
(2004, 2008) and Hayes (2009, 2012) and the resulting beta
coeﬃcients indicate the log odds of the probability of selecting
the best option. The mediation model hypothesizes an eﬀect
of the independent variable on the dependent variable through
a third explanatory variable, the mediator. The independent
variable aﬀects the mediator variable, which in turn aﬀects the
dependent variable. In this way the mediator clariﬁes the nature
of the relationship between the independent and dependent
variables (MacKinnon, 2008). The mediation model is described
in Figure 1; Table 2 we report the descriptive statistics of the
independent and dependent variables.
Path C: consumers with low Numeracy chose the worst deal
(higher ﬁnal price) more frequently than the highly numerate
consumers [Wald(1) = 5.25; β= 2.28; p = 0.022]3.
Path A: consumers with low Numeracy used the partial
decision approach more often than the highly numerate
consumers [Wald(1) = 6.76; β= 2.59; p = 0.009].
Path B: indicates a mediation eﬀect: when we include the
variable “decision approach,” which has a signiﬁcant eﬀect on
choice [Wald(1) = 4.74; β = 2.18; p = 0.030], Numeracy
does not have a signiﬁcant eﬀect [Wald(1) = 3.57; β = 1.90;
p = 0.059]. We measured the indirect eﬀect of the model
(the amount of mediation, i.e., the reduction of the eﬀect of
the initial independent variable on the outcome) through a
single bootstrapping test (see MacKinnon et al., 2002; Shrout
and Bolger, 2002; Preacher and Hayes, 2004, 2008). The result
conﬁrms the mediation eﬀect [indirect eﬀect: 95% CI (0.002,
0.138), based on 5000 bootstrap samples]. This result is coherent
with our prediction.
The analyses show that consumers with high Numeracy scores
chose the best commercial oﬀer more frequently. At the same
time, they were more likely to choose the oﬀer after having
3In both experiments we report standardized beta coeﬃcients, calculated following
the procedure proposed by Goodman (1972) and discussed by Menard (2004).
TABLE 1 | List of the products for shop A and B, with the corresponding initial prices and discounts, Experiment 1.
Shop A Shop B
Product Initial price (€) Discount (%) Final price (€) Initial price (€) Discount (%) Final price (€)
Mobile phone 180 15 153 220 25 165
DVD player 140 30 98 180 40 108
Microwave oven 70 20 56 90 30 63
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FIGURE 1 | The mediation model for Experiment 1 shows that Numeracy predicts the Decision Approach, which in turn predicts choice. ∗p < 0.05.
TABLE 2 | Descriptive statistics of the independent and dependent
variables of Experiment 1.
Average SD
Numeracy – number of correct
responses
7.39 2.3
Time needed to complete the
decision task (ms)
55025 26270
Proportions
Decision approach Complete approach:
55.6%
Partial approach:
44.4%
Choice Best option: 83.7% Worst option: 16.3%
calculated both ﬁnal prices, that is by the means of a complete
decision approach to the purchase decision task. On the contrary,
consumers with low Numeracy often chose by means of a partial
decision approach. They reported that they made the choice
without doing any calculation at all, or by the computation of just
one ﬁnal price. This indicates that they chose without knowing
the real economic values of the alternatives (the partial decision
approach has been used 58.8% of the times by consumers with
numeracy scores equal or lower than the median and 41.2% of
the times by consumers with numeracy scores higher than the
median).
The next step of the mediation analysis shows that consumers
who used a complete decision approach chose the best discount
more frequently, compared to the consumers who used a partial
decision approach [90.6% vs. 75%, χ2 (1) = 6.7; p = 0.01]. The
ﬁnal step of the mediation model indicates that the decision
approach is a more relevant predictor of purchase decision
skill than Numeracy. In other words, consumers with higher
Numeracy scores are more likely to use the complete decision
approach than consumers with low Numeracy, but if they use
the partial decision approach their choices are not diﬀerent from
the choices of the consumers with low Numeracy. In fact, if
we consider only the consumers who used a partial approach,
a logistic regression analysis indicates that Numeracy does not
predict choice quality [Wald(1) = 0.01; β = −0.1; p = 0.92].
On the contrary, if we consider only the consumers who used
a complete approach, Numeracy signiﬁcantly predicts choice
quality [Wald(1) = 7.40; β = 2.72; p = 0.007]. As a ﬁnal analysis,
we compared how much time the consumers needed to decide
with the partial or the complete approach and a t-test indicates
that consumers who use the partial approach are signiﬁcantly
faster than those who use the complete approach [M = 48.5 s vs.
M = 60.2 s; t-test (151) = −2.8; p = 0.006]. A similar result has
been shown by Cokely and Kelley (2009).
Conclusion
The mediation model shows that the decision approach is a
critical factor of the decision process: the partial approach
reduces the ability to ﬁnd the best option, even for the
highly numerate consumers, while when the consumers use the
complete approach the likelihood of selecting the best option
depends on Numeracy. The mediation model shows that some
highly numerate consumers use a partial decision approach to
solve the economic decision problem, and this cannot be due
to a lack of numeric competence. Said diﬀerently, the use of a
partial decision approach to solve the economic problem might
depend on plural factors, rather than just Numeracy. To our
view, one relevant factor is the attitude about how to approach
a decision problem and we used the CRT to explore a speciﬁc
element of this general attitude: the propensity to act reﬂexively
when facing a decision problem. The role of Cognitive Reﬂection
is fully investigated in the next experiment as a potential factor,
and compared to Numeracy as a predictor of the quality of the
purchase decision.
Reflexiveness and the Cognitive Reflection
Test
Reﬂectiveness is a broad psychological notion. It has been
extensively studied in diﬀerent ﬁelds of psychology (e.g.,
cognitive, clinical, social, and consumer psychology) and
economics (e.g., judgment and decision-making). While
researchers in psychology have focused more on the ability
to control impulsive behavior (Eysenck and Eysenck, 1978;
Rook and Fisher, 1995; Puri, 1996; see also Grecucci et al.,
2014 on the role of impulsivity in compulsive gambling),
economists and decision researchers were more focused in
hyperbolic discounting, or more generally in the ability to
delay gratiﬁcations (Monterosso and Ainslie, 1999). Studies in
psychology have emphasized the distinction between cognitive
processes that occur spontaneously and require a moderate
level of attention and processes requiring eﬀort, motivation,
concentration, and the execution of complex learned rules.
According to Stanovich and West (2000) and Evans (2008)
these diﬀerent cognitive processes would be supported by two
diﬀerent systems: a basic system (System 1) of eﬀortless and rapid
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perception that drive intuitive and elementary operations and a
more sophisticated system (System 2) which is slow, analytical,
and rational.
Following this theoretical framework, the CRT was conceived
as a measure of the ability to control a high accessible (incorrect)
answer in favor of a less accessible (correct) answer which
requires further deliberation. In the words of the author “CRT
measures ‘Cognitive Reﬂection’ – the ability or disposition to
resist reporting the response that ﬁrst comes to mind” (Frederick,
2005, p. 35). Many researchers since the original publication have
used and still use the CRT as a measure of Cognitive Reﬂection
(see for example, Cokely and Kelley, 2009; Fernbach et al., 2013).
In particular, we use the term “cognitive impulsivity” to describe
the cognitive style of people with low CRT scores.
The CRT consists of three mathematical word problems that
elicit spontaneous, intuitive and incorrect answers. For example,
in one of the CRT problems participants face the following
question: “A bat and a ball cost $1.10. The bat costs $1.00 more
than the ball. Howmuch does the ball cost?” The intuitive answer
to this problem is “10 cents,” whereas the correct one is “5 cents.”
Frederick’s study shows that CRT is associated to the performance
in several decision tasks. For example, in the inter-temporal
decision task it has been found that participants with high CRT
are more patient, e.g., they chose more frequently the larger
reward at a later time, instead of a smaller immediate reward (e.g.,
they prefer 140$ in a year to 100$ now). In risk choice tasks, it has
been found that high CRT participants are more willing to take
a gamble that has a high expected payoﬀ (instead of a sure gain),
compared to low CRTparticipants (e.g., they choose a 90% to gain
500$ over a sure gain of 100$). Subsequent studies report results
which are in line with Frederick’s ﬁndings: for example, Oechssler
et al. (2009) show that people with high scores in the CRT are
much less subject to the conjunction fallacy in Linda’s problem
and they update probability estimates more correctly, compared
to low CRT people. According to Campitelli and Labollita (2010),
high CRT people are better (compared to low CRT people) at
using their background knowledge in order to guess the right
answer to question on topics about which they know little of. It
has been shown that there is a relationship between the ability to
answer correctly to the CRT and Numeracy questions. Frederick
(2005) reports that there is a moderate correlation between CRT
and the SAT Mathematics scores (0.46). Del Missier et al. (2012)
showed that the CRT scores depends on the executive functions
of Monitoring and Inhibition (the capacity to appropriately
inhibit irrelevant information and responses and the capacity to
monitor and revise working memory contents). However, this
eﬀect is partially mediated by Numeracy (measured with the
scale by Lipkus et al., 2001). Overall, the experimental ﬁndings
indicate that the CRT scores depends on (at least) two elements:
reﬂexiveness and numeracy.
Nofsinger and Varma (2007) found results similar to those
of Frederick interviewing a sample of ﬁnancial advisors. In the
domain of the economic decisions Moritz et al. (2013) show that
managers with high CRT scores take more proﬁtable decisions.
Mixed evidence has been found about the relation between CRT
scores and the answers given to moral dilemmas (Paxton et al.,
2012; Royzman et al., 2014).
Experiment 2
In Experiment 2 we investigate the role of reﬂectiveness on
the decision process and the quality of the purchase decision.
In Experiment 1, we found that consumers who use a partial
approach make their decisions faster and choose the best
oﬀer less often compared to those who use a complete
approach. This decision pattern is associated to a low level
of numerical skills. However, reported ﬁndings suggest that,
in addition to Numeracy, cognitive impulsivity might inhibit
people from making a full computation of ﬁnal prices. For
example, cognitively impulsive consumers might well focus on
accessible information to guess which is the best option (e.g.,
the product with the lowest initial price), although they have
the cognitive resources to make the extensive computation (e.g.,
high Numeracy). Based on previously presented ﬁndings, CRT
seems to us a good tool to measure cognitive impulsivity in a
commercial context. For example, low CRT consumers might
rely on accessible information (e.g., lowest initial price; higher
percentage discount) to quickly select what looks to them the best
deal. This might be the ﬁrst thought that comes to mind to an
impulsive consumer. If not corrected, it might lead the consumer
to select the suboptimal oﬀer. This impulsive consumer choice
should be reﬂected also in the decision process. For example, we
also expect that low CRT consumers use a simpliﬁed information
search pattern, compared to high CRT consumers. To that end, in
Experiment 2 we record eye movements while participants select
one of two oﬀers in 12 discount choice problems. Our objective
is to test whether high cognitive reﬂective consumers are more
likely, compared to low cognitive reﬂective consumers, to use an
information search pattern which enable them to compute the
ﬁnal prices, and whether the probability of selecting the best deal
depends on the application of this pattern.
A correct procedure to compute the ﬁnal prices requires
the decision makers to compare the initial price of each
option with the associated discount and engage themselves in
a mental calculation. In terms of information search pattern,
this procedure requires to use vertical eye movements (saccades
between an initial price and the relative discount; see Figure 2)
and long ﬁxations. Vertical eye movements are expected because
the initial price and the relative discount are displayed one
above the other and this implies that the participants attention
should move between these two pieces of information while
calculating the ﬁnal price. Long ﬁxations are expected because
the mental calculation of the ﬁnal price is a complex cognitive
operation that is composed of a set of distinct functional
processes and longer ﬁxations are commonly associated to deeper
processing, such as deliberate consideration of information and
planning (Velichkovsky, 1999; Velichkovsky et al., 2002; Eivazi
and Bednarik, 2011; Glöckner and Herbold, 2011). On the
other hand, people who use a partial approach in the selection
of the commercial oﬀer might exhibit a diﬀerent information
search pattern. For example, they might compare initial prices
and discounts separately. In case that one of the alternatives
yields a higher discount with a lower initial price, the decision
makers choose that option. Alternatively, they may select the
option with the higher discount or with the lower initial
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FIGURE 2 | Two examples of economic problems. In the first example (A) the more worthwhile option is the one with the low initial price (Shop B), in the second
example (B) the best option is the one with the high initial price (Shop A).
price. This simple comparison procedure involves horizontal eye
movements (between option transitions) and do not require long
ﬁxations because it is less demanding in terms of cognitive eﬀort.
Method
Forty-four persons participated in the experiment, but nine of
them were excluded (ﬁve due to poor calibration of the eye-
tracking system and excessive number of trial losses, one because
of the unusually high mean number of ﬁxations across problems,
and three because they reported, after the end of the experiment,
that they were previously aware of some of the answers of
the CRT). The mean age of the remaining 35 participants (14
males and 21 females) is 24.5 (SD = 3.47). The experiment was
performed in accordance with the ethical standards laid down
in the 1964 Declaration of Helsinki, and all participants gave
informed consent prior to admission into the study.
After entering the lab, participants were informed of the
nature of the “purchase decision ” task. Participants responded
to 12 discount choice problems presented in a random order. For
each problem the participants decided whether to buy a product
(e.g., DVD player) at shop A or B. The two shops, A and B, sold
the same identical product which was on sale with diﬀerent initial
prices and percentage discounts. For half of the problems the
best deal is the one with the lowest initial price (see Figure 2A),
for the other half it is the one with the highest initial price
(Figure 2B). For each discount choice problem, participants had
to select their response by pressing the corresponding key on the
keyboard. Before starting the experiment, participants performed
four practice trials. Choices and ﬁxation times were automatically
registered. After the discount choice experiment, subjects were
asked to complete the Lipkus et al. (2001). Numeracy scale
(Lipkus et al., 2001) and the CRT (Frederick, 2005)4.
Eye-Tracking Procedures
Participants were seated in a chair with a soft head restraint to
ensure a viewing distance of 60 cm to themonitor. Presentation of
4The original studies about the Lipkus Numeracy scale (Lipkus et al., 2001) and
the CRT (Frederick, 2005) indicate that the two scales have diﬀerent diﬃculty
levels (68 and 41% of correct answers, respectively). This diﬀerence is relevant in a
context where the decision problem is diﬃcult, because a more diﬃcult scale may
diﬀerentiate people more eﬀectively (i.e., diﬀerentiate them at the appropriate level
of performance) that a less diﬃcult scale.
the stimuli was performed using a custom made program written
using the Matlab Psychophysical toolbox. Eye movements were
monitored and recorded using an Eyelink II system (SR. Research
Ontario Canada) with a sampling rate of 500 Hz. A ﬁxation
was deﬁned as an interval in which gaze was focused within 1◦
of visual angle for at least 100 ms. (Manor and Gordon, 2003).
A nine-point calibration was performed at the beginning of the
experiment. Calibration phase was repeated until the diﬀerence
between the positions of the points on the screen and the
corresponding eye locations was less than 1◦. After the calibration
phase, a nine-point validation phase was performed (similarly
to the calibration phase) to make sure that the calibration was
accurate. Recalibrations were performed if needed, and eye-
tracking was stopped if these were unsuccessful. Before the
beginning of each trial a drift correction was performed. Then,
a ﬁxation point was presented in the same position as the last
point of the drift correction for 300 ms. The ﬁxation point was
located at the bottom of the two possible options, outside the area
covered by the picture representing the discount choice problem.
Each discount choice problem was presented after the ﬁxation
point and remained on the screen until a response was made. Eye
movements were recorded during the purchase decision problem
display (Figure 3).
Eye-Tracking-Data
For each of the 12 problems, we deﬁned four areas of interest
(AOIs). All of them have a rectangular shape (Figure 4) and
are centered on the four values (the two initial selling prices
and the two discounts). The four AOIs include all the relevant
information needed by the participants to make their decisions.
Non-numerical information like the type of product (DVD
player, microwave etc.) were not considered in the analysis
because it was made clear at the beginning of the experiment that
the two shops were delivering the same product and that the only
diﬀerence between the two shops (A and B) were the initial selling
prices and the discounts. None of the AOIs were adjacent to the
others. This allowed us to avoid the possibility that small errors in
the calibration procedures could result in an incorrect attribution
of the eye movements parameters (ﬁxations and saccades, see
below). This is especially useful for those situations in which
the parameter was located on the border of an AOI. AOIs do
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FIGURE 3 | Task and time course of a trial. At the end of the drift
correction, a fixation point was displayed for 300 ms on the bottom of the two
possible options. Then, the economic problem was displayed onscreen until a
response was made.
FIGURE 4 | Eye movement for one participant while responding to the
discount choice problem. Blue lines indicate saccades and red circles the
location of fixations (the size of circle is proportional to the length of the
fixations). The red number next to the red circle indicates length of the fixation.
Blinks are indicated with light blue lines. The blue rectangles (not visible to the
participants) represent the AOIs.
not cover the picture representing the discount choice problem
entirely (but less than 8% of the screen) and never overlap.
In this way, AOIs include only ﬁxations and saccades whose
interpretation is not ambiguous. Those parameters that were not
located inside the AOIs were not considered in the analysis.
However, although a large part of the picture is not included in
any AOI, the majority of ﬁxations observed fell inside the AOIs
(88%). For each trial, we recorded the average length of ﬁxations
for each of the four AOIs, the number of times that the participant
looked within an AOI, and the number and type of saccades,
which correspond to the transitions made by the eye from one
AOI to the next.
Results
Choices: Numeracy and CRT
First, we investigated the inﬂuence of Numeracy on the
participants’ ability to select the best oﬀer. As in Experiment
1, Numeracy is measured by the number of correct answers
given to the Lipkus scale and we treated Numeracy as a
continuous variable. The binary dependent variable is the quality
of commercial choice (i.e., the selection of the best deal). We
decided to use a mixed regression model because the participants
answered 12 discount choice problems which are considerably
diﬀerent from one another. They involve diﬀerent products and
diﬀerent price ranges. Also, the absolute diﬀerence and the ratio
of the initial and ﬁnal prices change. This variability can be
explained using the concept of “random factors,” i.e., variables
whose levels are drawn “from a large (potentially very large)
population in which the individuals diﬀer in many ways, but
we do not know exactly how or why they diﬀer” (Crawley,
2007, p. 628). The mixed regression model (unlike ANOVA and
simple linear regression) provides a way to take into account
the added variation caused by diﬀerences between the levels of
the random factors (Baayen et al., 2008; Fugard et al., 2011).
As a consequence we included in our model a random factor
called “Problem,” that discriminates among the 12 discount
choice problems. Results from the logistic mixed model show
the importance of Numeracy: higher Numeracy signiﬁcantly
increases the choice of the best options (β = 0.47, Z = 2.23,
p= 0.03). In a second model, in addition to Numeracy, we added
the factor CRT, considering the four levels of ability (from 0 to
3 correct answers). This model shows that Numeracy does not
longer aﬀect the choice of the best option (β = 0.26, Z = 1.18,
p = 0.32), while CRT does (β = 0.82, Z = 3.42, p < 0.001).
Given that these variables explore two related constructs we
decided to verify the level of collinearity between them, so
we calculated the variance inﬂation factor (VIF). Usually the
largest VIF is taken to be a measure of the seriousness of
collinearity among the predictors and the higher the value, the
higher the collinearity. The deﬁnition of “high” is arbitrary but
values higher than 4 or 5 are commonly considered an index of
excessive correlation among explanatory variables. We found an
index of 1.07 which allows us to exclude collinearity problems
between the variables. As a second test, we also calculated the
correlation between CRT and Numeracy to check for possible
diﬀerences between our study and previous studies. We opted
for the Spearman correlation coeﬃcient, as it is not possible to
assume neither that the variables are normally distributed nor
that there is a linear correlation between them (both of which
are necessary assumptions for the use of the Pearson correlation
coeﬃcient). Results show that the variables (CRT and Numeracy)
are marginally correlated [Spearman correlation, r(35) = 0.29,
p = 0.09]. In previous studies, Cokely and Kelley (2009) reported
a signiﬁcant correlation of 0.31. A stronger correlation was
found in Finucane and Gullion (2010; r = 0.53) and in Liberali
et al. (2012; r = 0.51 and r = 0.40). Despite the small size of
our sample due to the constraints imposed by the eye-tracking
device (participants have to be tested individually), the degree of
correlation we found between Numeracy and CRT is in line with
the correlation level obtained by Cokely and Kelley (2009).
Results from the mixed model regression analyses are
congruent with those obtained in Experiment 1, and they
highlight the role of Cognitive Reﬂection in the selection of the
best commercial oﬀer. In Figure 5 we report the relationship
between performance on the CRT and the proportion of best
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FIGURE 5 | Assessment of the relationship between the performance
on the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) and the level of accuracy
(proportion of best offers chosen) achieved by the participants in the
12 discount choice problems (mean and SD).
oﬀers chosen by the participants. Table 3 details the summary
statistics for the questionnaires and the eye-tracking analysis,
while Table 4 describe the parameters of the mixed models
presented below.
CRT and Eye Movements
As shown in the previous section, the eﬀect of Numeracy
scores on the proportion of best oﬀers chosen is no longer
signiﬁcant when included in the same model with the CRT
scores; therefore, in the following analyses, we focus only on
the relationship between CRT and eye movements. Our research
hypothesis predicts that participants with diﬀerent levels of
CRT use diﬀerent decision processes and we investigate this
prediction using three eye movement parameters (number and
length of ﬁxations and the Search Index (SI) calculated on the
vertical/horizontal saccades).
Analysis of saccades
Vertical saccades are movements from one of the top cells
(prices) to its corresponding lower cell (discount) or vice-versa
(within-option or cue-based search). Horizontal saccades are
movements from left to right (or vice-versa), so they connect the
two prices or the two discounts (between-option or option-based
search). In order to summarize the participants’ search patterns
we calculated the (see Norman and Schulte-Mecklenbeck, 2010
for a theoretical description and Glöckner and Betsch, 2008
for an application of the SI to an eye-tracking study). The
SI is calculated by subtracting the number of between-option
transitions from the number of within-option transitions and
dividing this diﬀerence by the sum of both transitions. SI ranges
from −1 to +1 and negative values indicate more between-
option searches, while positive values indicate more within-
option searches. Within-option transitions are necessary to link
the initial price with the corresponding discount, in order to
calculate the ﬁnal price. Conversely, between options transitions
in our purchase decision task do not give rise to any economically
relevant comparison.
We run a linear mixed model to test the hypothesis that
participants who obtained high scores in the CRT were more
prone to use within-option transitions. Results indicate that
higher CRT scores signiﬁcantly increase the proportion of vertical
(within-option) transitions (higher SI, β = 0.27, t = 5.68,
p< 0.001).
Analysis of the average length of fixations
The data were treated in the following way: we calculated the
average length of ﬁxations for each AOI and used the natural
logarithm transformation of the values in order to approximate a
normal distribution (Newell and Rosenbloom, 1981). The average
length of ﬁxations for the two price areas are highly correlated,
[r(35) = 0.94, p < 0.001], like the average length of ﬁxations for
the two discount areas [r(35) = 0.70, p < 0.001]. Conversely, the
correlations between the average length of ﬁxations for the each of
the two prices with each of the two discounts are not signiﬁcant.
Given these results, we considered the areas of the two prices as a
single area of interest and, similarly, we treated the two discounts
as a single area of interest. The factors length of ﬁxations for
the Price Area (LF-P) and length of ﬁxations for the Discount
Area (LF-D) indicate the average length of ﬁxations on the two
macro-areas.
We run a linear mixed model to evaluate the hypothesis that
the score obtained in the CRT is positively correlated with LF-P.
Results indicate that a higher score in the CRT signiﬁcantly
TABLE 3 | Descriptive statistics of the independent and dependent
variables of Experiment 2.
Average SD
Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) – number of correct
responses
1.40 1.31
Numeracy – number of correct responses 8.11 1.94
Response time (ms) 20604 14586
Mean fix duration (ms) 323 83
Mean fix duration (shop A) (ms) 317 83
Mean fix duration (shop B) (ms) 314 75
Mean fix duration (prices) (ms) 366 111
Mean fix duration (discounts) (ms) 249 43
Total fixation time per decision (ms) 17061 14503
Total AOI fixation time per decision (ms) 16115 11702
Total fixation time per decision (shop A) (ms) 8874 6935
Total fixation time per decision (shop B) (ms) 7255 5589
Total fixation time per decision (prices) (ms) 12319 10110
Total fixation time per decision (discounts) (ms) 3804 2271
Number of total fixations per decision 49 35
Number of AOI fixations per decision 43 24
Number of AOI fixations per decision (shop A) 23 13
Number of AOI fixations per decision (shop B) 20 11
Number of between-option transitions per decision (prices) 4.90 1.94
Number of between-option transitions per decision
(discounts)
1.99 0.99
Number of within-option transitions per decision (shop A) 7.15 4.10
Number of within-option transitions per decision (shop B) 6.41 3.93
Eye-tracking statistics are calculated during the discount choice problem
presentation.
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TABLE 4 | A summary of the generalized linear mixed models used to test the relations among accuracy and questionnaires scores (Numeracy and
CRT), among eye-movements parameters and CRT scores and among accuracy and eye-movements parameters.
Dependent variable Predictors Standardized coefficients β Z/t-value p-value
Choices Numeracy 0.47 Z = 2.23 =0.03
N◦ of obs. = 420 AIC = 494.4 BIC = 506.5 LogL = −244.2
Choices Numeracy 0.26 Z = 1.18 =0.32
CRT 0.82 Z = 3.42 <0.001
N◦ of obs. = 420 AIC = 484.5 BIC = 500.7 LogL = −238.3
SI CRT 0.27 t = 5.68 <0.001
N◦ of obs. = 420 AIC = 120.4 BIC = 136.6 LogL = −56.6
LF-P CRT 0.33 t = 7.21 <0.001
N◦ of obs. = 420 AIC = 264.8 BIC = 281.0 LogL = −128.4
LF-D CRT 0.08 t = 1.57 =0.12
N◦ of obs. = 420 AIC = 90.5 BIC = 106.7 LogL = −41.3
NF-P CRT 0.20 t = 4.15 <0.001
N◦ of obs. = 420 AIC = 3805.3 BIC = 3821.5 LogL = −1898.7
NF-D CRT 0.06 t = 1.16 =0.25
N◦ of obs. = 420 AIC = 3115.7 BIC = 3131.9 LogL = −1553.8
SI LF-P 0.27 t = 5.55 <0.001
NF-P 0.23 t = 5.04 <0.001
N◦ of obs. = 420 AIC = 65.7 BIC = 85.9 LogL = −27.8
Choices LF-P 0.49 Z = 1.77 =0.07
NF-P 0.12 Z = 0.80 =0.42
SI −0.08 Z = −0.44 =0.66
N◦ of obs. = 420 AIC = 497.2 BIC = 517.4 LogL = −243.6
Choices LF-P 0.49 Z = 1.72 =0.08
NF-P 0.14 Z=0.71 =0.48
N◦ of obs. = 420 AIC = 495.4 BIC = 511.6 LogL = −243.7
Choices LF-P 0.53 Z = 2.27 =0.02
N◦ of obs. = 420 AIC = 493.9 BIC = 506.0 LogL = −244.0
increases the LF-P (β = 0.33, t = 7.21, p < 0.001). The same
analysis was repeated to evaluate the association between CRT
and LF-D, but this time the predictor was not statistically
signiﬁcant (β = 0.08, t = 1.57, p = 0.12).
Fixation counts
We recorded how many times the participants looked at a
certain AOI and, paralleling the analyses on the average ﬁxation
length, we aggregated the AOIs into two macro-areas: the Price
Area and the Discount Area. The factors number of ﬁxations
in the Price (NF-P) and Discount Areas (NF-D) indicate the
average number of ﬁxations within each of the two macro-
areas. Then, we ran two linear mixed models and tested whether
the score obtained in the CRT is positively correlated with
the NF-P and NF-D factors. Similarly to what we observed in
the analysis of the average length of ﬁxations, we found that
participants who have a higher score in the CRT have a higher
number of ﬁxations in the Price Area (β = 0.20, t = 4.15,
p < 0.001) but not in the Discount Area (β = 0.06, t = 1.16,
p = 0.25).
Overall, results of the saccades and ﬁxation analyses show that
participants with diﬀerent CRT scores used diﬀerent information
search patterns. In particular, the performance on the CRT is
positively related to the proportion of within-option transitions
and the average length and number of ﬁxations in the Price
Area.
Relationship between the depth of the elaboration process
and the within-option search strategy
We studied the relationship between ﬁxations (average length
and number of ﬁxations) and saccades (SI) because we
expected to ﬁnd an association between the depth of the
elaboration process and the within-option search strategy. For
the SI a linear mixed model with the factors LF-P and NF-
P shows that the average length and number of ﬁxations is
signiﬁcantly associated with the proportion of within-option
transitions. More precisely, the proportion of within-option
transitions increases when the length (β = 0.27, t = 5.55,
p < 0.001) and the number of ﬁxations (β = 0.23, t = 5.04,
p < 0.001) increase within the Price Area. This result
indicates that the participants who processed the problem
information more deeply used a within-option evaluation
strategy.
Eye Movements and Choice Accuracy
Finally, we test the relationship between the information search
patterns and the probability of selecting the best oﬀer. We run
a series of logistic mixed model that includes the eye movement
parameters that had a signiﬁcant eﬀect in the previous analyses
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(SI, the LF-P, and the NF-P) using the backward elimination
procedure and we test whether they are good predictors of
choice accuracy (i.e., how often the participants chose the more
advantageous option). The initial model (AIC = 497.2) which
includes the three predictors shows that LF-P is marginally
signiﬁcant (β = 0.49, Z = 1.77, p = 0.07), while NF-P (β = 0.12,
Z = 0.80, p = 0.426), and SI (β = −0.08, Z = −0.44, p = 0.663)
are not. We eliminated SI, the least relevant predictor, and we run
a model with the variables LF-P and NF-P. The ﬁt of the model
improves (AIC = 495.4), LF-P has a marginally signiﬁcant eﬀect
(β = 0.49, Z = 1.72, p = 0.08), while NF-P does not (β = 0.14,
Z = 0.71, p = 0.48). Finally, we eliminated the variable NF-P and
now the model shows another improvement in the goodness-of-
ﬁt (AIC = 493.9) and a fully signiﬁcant eﬀect of LF-P (β = 0.53,
Z = 2.27, p = 0.023).
Information Search Patterns for High and Low CRT
Scores
In order to give a general picture of the information search
patterns used by participants with diﬀerent CRT scores we
divided them into two groups – high and low CRT – and
we compared their search patterns. Participants who gave two
or three correct answers were classiﬁed as “high CRT” (17
participants) and those who gave one or zero correct answers as
“low CRT” (18 participants). As shown in Figure 6 the average
length of ﬁxations on the price areas for high CRT participants
is almost 100 ms longer compared to low CRT participants (low
CRT = 334 ms; high CRT = 423 ms). Conversely no diﬀerences
were found on the Discount areas (low CRT = 249 ms; high
CRT = 258 ms). These results suggest that high CRT participants
are more likely to engage themselves in the calculation of the
ﬁnal prices and that the mental calculation of the ﬁnal discounted
prices was performed while ﬁxating on the price areas, which
greatly simpliﬁed the maintenance of the initial prices in the
working memory. The two groups diﬀer also in the number of
vertical saccades (low CRT = 6.05; high CRT = 7.5) but not
in the number of horizontal saccades (low CRT = 3.55; high
CRT = 3.35), which is in accordance with the fact that only
saccades between price and discount values are useful for the
mental calculation.
In general, we suggest that high CRT participants are more
likely to remain focused on the initial prices, using vertical
saccades to read and maintain the discount values in working
memory. This information search pattern is suitable for the
mental calculation of the ﬁnal price. Conversely, low CRT
participants are more likely to use a less speciﬁc information
search pattern which does not include the mental calculation of
the ﬁnal price (see Figure 6 below).
Conclusion
Reported ﬁndings suggest that the ability to choose the best
option in a simple purchase decision problem depends not
only on numerical skills, but also on cognitive impulsivity as
measured by the CRT. We also found that the CRT predicts the
information search pattern used which, in turn, aﬀects the quality
of purchase decision. Speciﬁcally, we found that consumers
with low levels of Cognitive Reﬂection do not use a suﬃciently
detailed information search pattern and pick a low proportion
of the more advantageous oﬀers. Experiment 2 extends the
ﬁndings of Experiment 1 to a series of choices about a variety of
consumers goods, giving amore robust description of consumers’
behavior.
General Discussion
Consumers must often decide which is the most advantageous
economic option among a list of alternatives, and the literature
FIGURE 6 | Information processing; for low (left) and high (right)
CRT participants. The numbers within the blue circles indicates the
average length (in milliseconds) of fixations for the four AOIs (the
radius of the circles is proportional to the average length of
fixations). The numbers superimposed on the red lines indicates the
average number of saccades for the four types of transitions the
thickness of the lines is proportional to the average number of
saccades).
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shows that sometimes they choose poorly in conditions of
risk or uncertainty (Starmer, 2000; Kahneman, 2003; Bonini
et al., 2004; Shu, 2006). Consumers also show poor performance
when coping with riskless choice. For example, when they
have to ﬁnd which is the cheapest goods bundle for a certain
product or – as in the present study – which is the best deal
(see Armstrong, 2010 for a comprehensive analysis on this
point).
Our research aims to expand the current knowledge about the
characteristics of economic behavior by studying the inﬂuence of
two cognitive skills: Numeracy and Cognitive Reﬂection. While it
has already been shown that higher levels of cognitive skills (e.g.,
ability to plan, memory, etc.) are associated with better choices
(Burks et al., 2009; Christelis et al., 2010), the comprehension of
the link between decision processes and cognitive skills is still
limited. In addition, the association between CRT scores and
choices has been little studied in the context of the economic
domain – one of the few examples is the study by Finucane and
Gullion (2010).
In a series of purchase decision problems, our experimental
ﬁndings indicate that consumers with high CRT scores and
high Numeracy are signiﬁcantly more likely to make the
more advantageous choice, compared to people who are more
cognitively impulsive and/or less numerate. Starting from our
experimental hypotheses this result can be explained by the
diﬀerent decision processes that characterize participants with
high/low scores in the CRT and Numeracy Test. In Experiment
1 we show that consumers with low Numeracy use a partial
decision approach, i.e., they use only part of the numeric
information provided and they do not compute all the operations
needed to identify the best option. Hence, they select the worst
option much more frequently, compared to highly numerate
consumers. In Experiment 2 we found that both CRT and
Numeracy have an inﬂuence, with a particularly strong eﬀect of
the former variable, on the aptness of the purchase decisions.
It is relevant to note that previous studies (see for example
Del Missier et al., 2012) indicate the CRT scores are partly
inﬂuenced by Numeracy. In the present study we did not estimate
the relative importance of the two sides of CRT (reﬂexiveness
and Numeracy) but the results from Experiment 2 and the
ﬁndings of Del Missier et al. (2012) suggest that the quality
of purchase choices depend on the (in) capacity of inhibiting
an intuitive (although) wrong answer and on Numeracy. In
addition to the eﬀect of the cognitive skills on choice, the
analyses on the eye movement data show that people with
lower CRT scores adopt a shallow search pattern, which is
associated with worse performance in the purchase decision
task.
On the whole, both experiments support our experimental
hypotheses that people with greater cognitive skills are more
likely to use thorough decision-making processes, which produce
a higher number of optimal choices.
We believe that the reported ﬁndings can contribute to
the growing literature on the vulnerability of consumers (see
OECD, 2010 consumer policy toolkit). As shown by a recent
survey on proﬁciency in key information-processing skills among
working-age adults (OECD, 2013), insuﬃcient Numeracy is a
widespread phenomenon: only one adult out of three is able
to act upon and correctly interpret relatively simple data and
statistics in texts, tables and graphs. The great extent of the
phenomenon indicates that Numeracy is certainly one factor
in consumer vulnerability, as shown also in our study. This
vulnerability appears also in very common economic problems,
where consumers make decisions based upon the computation
of simple numeric information such as integers or percentages
(see Yin and Dubinsky, 2004 on the inﬂuence of comparative
price formats and Graﬀeo and Bonini, 2015, on the relationship
between Numeracy and comparative price formats). However,
reported ﬁndings add another factor to the vulnerability list:
lack of cognitive reﬂection or cognitive impulsivity. Consumers
with low CRT scores tend to choose poorly, most likely because
their ﬁrst impression of “the best deal” is not corrected by
further information processing (e.g., the computation of the ﬁnal
prices).
These ﬁndings are of interest for both marketing experts
and consumer policy specialists since there is a recent
and growing concern in the European Union about unfair
commercial practices, and consumer rights in general (European
Parliament, and Council, 2005, 2011). Furthermore, ﬁndings
suggest that the attributes that characterize the eﬀective
decision-maker include particular cognitive skills other than
ﬁnancial or mathematical knowledge. This conclusion is
congruent with the broad deﬁnition of “ﬁnancial capability”
provided by OECD (PISA, 2012, p. 13) where it is stated
that: “Additionally [to knowledge and understanding of
ﬁnancial concepts and risks], ﬁnancial literacy involves skill
in managing the emotional and psychological factors that
inﬂuence ﬁnancial decision-making.” We believe that the ability
to counteract the ﬁrst (and false) impression of goodness in
a commercial setting is one of these crucial psychological
factors.
Finally, our ﬁndings show that the use of some speciﬁc
decision processes is an indicator that certain factors of
vulnerability are at work; a more detailed knowledge of these
processes could facilitate the development of comprehensive
guidelines that illustrate how to prevent some recurrent mistakes.
In this way it would be possible to mitigate the inﬂuence of
the vulnerability factors, in particular within socially relevant
domains.
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